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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAEGER AND BRANCH, INC., a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
JIM PAPPAS dba JIM PAPPAS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendant-Respondent 
Case No. 
10885 
Appeal from a Judgment against the Defendant 
Granted by the Third District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, Honorable Leonard W. Elton, 
Judge, Presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to collect $6,500.00 
by an alleged holder in due course of a check 
which was tendered by appellant who stopped 
payment for failure of consideration. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, 
Leonard W. Elton, Judge, after plaintiff pre-
sented a prima facia case and defendant 
presented his evidence, granted judgment in 
favor of plaintiff as a holder in due 
course and against the defendant in the sum 
of $6,500.00 with interest thereon at the rate 
of 6% per annum from January 18, 1966 plus 
costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judg-
ment of the District Court and a decision that 
as a matter of law plaintiff is not a holder 
in due course of appellant's check and is not 
entitled to the legal shelter arising from 
that status due to the notice which plaintiff 
received of a valid defense against the original 
payee and respondent's failure to show that 
it took for value and in good faith as required 
by the Utah Commercial Code. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are undisputed other than 
the question of whether or not the notice given 
was adequate to foreclose the claim of holder 
as a holder in due course. Appellant purchased 
a great number of items from one Allo Distri-
buting Company in his construction of a lodge 
in Park City, Utah) known as the C'est Bon' 
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Hotel. (Tr. 25-26) The last two deliveries 
were to be a large shipment of carpet (Tr. 
34 and 41) and a truck load of interior fur-
nishings. (Tr. 29,34 and 43) On or about 
January 9, 1966, the shipment of carpeting 
from Allo had been forwarded and was being 
held in Ogden by United Freight Forwarding 
and appellant could not get delivery. (Tr. 
41) On January 11 or 12, 1966, appellant talked 
with Allo and at Allo's request with respondent 
to determine why the shipment was beine held. 
(Tr. 48,49 and 73) The carpet was released 
and received on January 14, 1966. (Tr. 60) 
Appellant agreed to forward a check for the 
balance of the items which were supposed to 
have been shipped by Allo prior to receipt 
of the check as consideration for the amount 
paid. Appellant told Allo that unless the 
items were received, payment on the check would 
be stopped. (Tr. 51 and 74) On January 12, 
1966, appellant spoke by telephone at Allo's 
request with respondent concerning the pay-
ment to Allo. (Tr. 55) The first conver-
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sation was to determine why the carpet was 
being held and the second was to determine 
whether they were paid in full for the materials 
purchased by Allo for appellant. (Tr. 57) 
Taking the testimony of defendant and 
his witness most favorably to the defendant, 
together with reasonable inferences therefrom, 
the following testimony from conversations 
between defendant and Allo Distributing Company 
and between the defendant and Mrs. Voorhees 
and the plaintiff's Mr. Don Moreland, should 
receive careful consideration from the Court 
"The reason for stopping payment on the check 
on January 18, 1966, was overpayment. If (Tr. 22) 
"The check reached the Walker Bank January 22," 
(Tr. 23) It was agreed at pre-trial that the 
check was negotiated to plaintiff January 14. 
(Tr. 32) The corversations to the plaintiff 
were made January 11, 1966. (Tr. 34 and Exhibit 
8) Allo Distributing agreed to ship an addi-
tional truckload of merchandise, which truck-
load never arrived. (Tr. 43) As of January 
10, 1966, assuming delivery of the carpets 
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being held up, defendant would have owed Allo 
$1,000 to $1,500. (Tr. 48) 
Plaintiff's Don Moreland was surprised 
the carpeting was being held up and told defendant 
"We couldn't know the carpets was being held 
up. We thought you received it. 11 and told 
defendant he couldn't give information about 
the account between Allo Distributing and Jaeger 
and Branch, but that 11 our business with Allo 
Distributing has been good" and when defendant 
said 'iI assume you have been paid in full and 
are real happy with the deal" Moreland answered 
11 Yes, and that it was not necessary to put 
Jaeger and Branch's name on the check he was 
sending to Al lo. (Tr. 5 0-51) 
An earlier conversation between Defendant 
and Allen Sandler of Allo Distributing made 
plain that $6,000.00 to be sent was for operat-
ing cash against future purchases and that 
Allo would release the carpet. (Tr. 50) In 
that and subsequent conversations Sandler 
assured defendant the truckload of merchan-
dise would be shipped and defendant stated: 
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11 If you don 1 t send th" me every ing you say you 
are going to do -- I have sent you a company 
check -- and I will stop payment on it 11 as to 
which Sandler said 11 Fine, go ahead." (Tr. 51) 
On the second conversation between 
defendant and Moreland, Moreland reiterated 
that Jaeger and Branch was not holding up the 
carpeting and that he could not release inform-
ation as to the account between Allo and 
Jaeger and Branch: 11 You are dealing with Allo. 
We have nothing to do with that. 11 And Moreland 
told defendant he couldn't say whether Allo had 
paid in full because it was against their 
business ethics but "our relationship with 
Allo Distributing is very good. 11 (Tr. 59) 
Mrs. Voorhees told Don Moreland 
11 negotiations was breaking down between Allo 
Distributing Company and Jim Pappas Construction, 
and we were having trouble getting our ship-
ments and getting our releasements, and we 
were afraid that we were going to end up shoved 
out of our order ~·: i; ~·: 11 that I would live up 
to my end of the bargain if they would live up 
to their end of the bargain -- is the way she 
said it to me. :i (Tr. 64-65) 
If the carpets had not been released 
the check for $6,500.00 would have overpaid 
Allo Distributiong "by $10,000.00 to $15,000.00 
without the check. l; (Tr. 6 6) 
On January 12th defendant told Allo 
Distributing he was sending them a check for 
$6,000.00 expecting the carpet to be released 
and also the other truckload of furniture to 
come up. (Tr. 7 3) 
Defendant verified what Allo Distri-
buting told him about not owing their suppliers 
"except with Mr. Moreland, he didn't know 
whether they owed money or didn't owe them 
money." (Tr. 75) 
Mrs. Voorhees talked to Don Moreland 
on January 11th in behalf of defendant and told 
him there was some question as to whether or 
not the wholesale distributors had been paid by 
Allo which she was attempting to ascertain and 
that other suppliers had been called with Mr. 
Sandler's permission. (Tr. 78) Moreland asked 
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if they were having difficulty with Allo and 
she said 1'No, not really difficult, but Al lo 
Distributing asked for more money and we just 
wanted to be sure that they weren't (sic.) 
maintaining their end of the contract. In part 
paid some of the money to Jaeger and Branchu. 
(Tr. 79) And again 1;Well, it seems as though 
relations have broken down between Mr. Pappas 
and Allo Distributing * * * Mr. Pappas has 
to this point paid somewhere in the vicinity 
of $45,000.00 to these people, and we have 
received very little of the goods. a (Tr. 81) 
and upon being informed that carpeting was being 
held up Mr. Moreland said 11 We have nothing to 
do with that". (Tr. 81) 
Mrs. Voorhees further explained to 
Moreland 1'.that Mr. Pappas was a little fearful 
that all the money that he was payine to them 
-.': .._,, :': wasn 1 t going where they said it was going:: 
and Moreland said if anything further came up 
along this line he would call Mrs. Voorhees. 
(Tr. 81) She told Moreland that Pappas was 
going to be sending money down and before doing 
so 11 he wanted to be sure that the moneys 
were going in the proper places 11 • (Tr. 8 2-8 3) 
The final shipment was not received. 
Payment on the check was stopped. Allo had 
transferred the check over to respondents who 
did not call appellant but called the drawee 
bank to see if there were funds to cover the 
check. The check was processed for payment 
by respondent. Prior to receipt by the bank, 
payment was stopped. (Tr. 21-24) 
POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
1. Legal notice was given to respondent 
of a valid defense. 
2. Respondent was put on notice as 
to the validity of the check and the defense 
to its payment. 
3. Respondent is not a holder in due 
course under the terms of the Utah Commercial 
Code. 
ARGUMENT 
This is the Court's first opportinity 
to review the provisions of the Utah Commer-
cial Code relating to the legal shelter created 
by the concept of holder in due course and the 
requirements of the code as to value, good 
faith and notice of defense which would over-
come that legal presumption. 
The trial court disposed of this case 
on plaintiff's Motion for Judgment at the 
close of defendant's evidence, plaintiff having 
presented only a prima facia case. On this 
motion and this appeal the evidence is to be 
construed in favor of the defendant and all 
reasonable implications arising from the 
evidence are to be resolved in favor of the 
defendant-appellant similar to granting of 
Summary Judgment, Bridge v. Backman, 10 Ut. 
2d 366, 353 P 2d 909 (1960) and Condas v. 
Adams, 15 Ut. 2d 132, 388 P 2d 803 (1964) 
The conversations between Mr. Pappas, 
Mrs. Voorhees and Mr. Moreland charged the 
respondent with notice thereof and the impli-
cation therefrom are also charged to the respon-
dent. The purpose of the first inquiry was 
to learn whether Jaeger and Branch had been 
paid. At this point the carpets were being 
held up and the respondent is charged with 
notice of the fact of the inquiry, the nature 
of the inquiry and the reason for the inquiry. 
Obviously, the situation between appellant 
and Allo was not satisfactory and appellant 
was raising a question both as to use of the 
money paid to Allo and whether there was a 
claim assertable against merchandise ordered 
by appellant and still undelivered. 
Respondent took the position on the 
telephone that it had been paid, and when 
pressed as to that took the position that it 
was none of the appellant's business to know 
of the relationship between respondent and 
Allo and that appellant need not concern itself 
with that fact, despite appellant's offer to 
put the name of Jaeger and Branch on the 
check it was sending as payment. 
Upon receipt of the check it is plain 
that respondent had some misgivings about it 
and placed a call to the bank upon which the 
check was drawn. This was not a reasonable 
thing to do. Jaeger and Branch had given 
nothing for the check, was not releasing any-
thing, since it denied that it was holding 
up the carpets and the purpose of the inquiry 
would seem to be that it was trying to make 
itself a holder in due course and get the 
money out of the bank before appellant could 
correct the situation between it and Allo 
Distributing. Since appellant had gone to the 
trouble of calling respondent four times on the 
telephone the only reasonable inquiry for 
respondent to make when it received the check 
from Allo Distributing, whom it knew to be in 
financial distress, was to clear the matter 
with the Appellant and make certain that the 
goods to be delivered by Allo had, in fact, 
been delivered and that no stop payment was to 
be outstanding on the check. The fact is, 
and respondent must have been apprehensive of 
that very situation, that had respondent called 
appellant it would have been told that the 
check was being held up until Allo performed 
in accordance with their agreement, which had 
been intimated in the earlier telephone 
conversations between these parties. 
Respondent is charged with this inform-
ation. Appellant plainly had a defense against 
Allo Distributing, the payee of the check, 
and upon establishing that defense the burden 
shifted to the plaintiff-respondent to show 
that it was a holder in due course, which burden 
the respondent did not sustain. 
POINT I. LEGAL NOTICE WAS GIVEN TO RESPONDENT 
OF A VALID DEFENSE. 
?OA-3-302 U.C.A, 1953 as amended: 
"(l) A holder in due course is a 
holder who takes the instrument 
(a) for value; and 
(b) in good faith; and 
(c) without notice that it is overd'ue 
or has been dishonored or of any 
defense against or claim to it on 
the part of any person." 
?OA-3-304 U.C.A., 1953 as amended: 
11 (1) The purchaser has notice of a 
claim or defense if ... 
(b) The purchaser has notice that the 
obligation of any party is voidable 
in whole or in part, or that all 
parties have been discharged ... 
(6) To be effective notice must be 
received at such time and in such 
manner as to give a reasonable opportu-
nity to act on it.n 
The notice required is defined in 70A-
1-201 U.C.A., 1953 as amended: 
1 ~(27) Notice, knowledge or a notice 
or notification received by an organ-
ization is effective for a particular 
transaction from the time when it is 
brought to the attention of the indivi-
dual conducting that transaction and . ' in any event from the time when it would 
have been brought to his attention if 
the organization had exercised due 
diligence. An organization exercises 
due diligence if it maintains reason-
able routines for communicating sign-
ificant information to the person 
conducting the transaction and there is 
reasonable compliance with the routines. 
Due diligence does not require an 
individual acting for the organization 
to communicate information unless such 
communication is part of his regular 
duties or unless he has reason to know 
of the transaction and that the trans-
action would be materially affected 
by the information. 11 
This legal notice is such knowledge 
to the respondent that Allo had not fulfilled 
its contract. Both appellant and Mrs. Voorhees 
disclosed to respondent that the delivery of 
carpets was being held up and that the final 
truckload of items had not been received. 
Both indicated to respondent that payment was 
requested for these items prior to their being 
received. That same knowledge imported to 
respondent notice that the shipments must 
be received before the check was valid. By 
the telephone calls respondent was notified 
that a check was being sent conditionally, 
that respondent could be a payee, and that 
Allo had not yet performed. It was also put 
on notice that Allo was not paying its bills 
and that appellant was trying to avoid paying 
for his merchandise twice. Notice of this 
legal defense is the notice required in 
70A-3-302, which nullifies the concept that 
respondent is a holder in due course and which 
under 70A-3-304, gives notice of a voidable 
obligation in whole or in part for failure 
of the consideration upon which the check 
was tendered. Allo falsely represented that 
the final shipment had been made, (Tr. 51), 
and it was the notification to respondent 
that before the check was payable this shipment 
was to be received which made the check void-
able at the election of the maker and constituted 
notice to the respondent that the legal shelter 
afforded a holder in due course would not 
become respondent's legal asylum. 
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POINT II. RESPONDENT WAS PUT ON NOTICE 
AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE CHECK AND THE 
DEFENSE TO ITS PAYMENT 
The "due diligence" required of the 
claimant in 70A-l-201 (27) as to the notice 
received required the respondent to determine 
that the check had not been cancelled because 
of Allo's failure to comply with shipment of 
promised items for which the check was pay-
ment and of which respondent had been notified. 
This same burden is expressed in 70A-3-307, 
U.C.A., 1953: 
" ( 3) After it is shown that a defense 
exists a person claiming the rights of 
a holder in due course has the burden 
of establishing that he or some person 
under whom he claims is in all respects 
a holder in due course." 
There is a duty to inquire of the appel-
lant as to the validity of the check when 
notice has been given as to the condition 
upon which the check was tendered. Appellant 
has the burden of showing a failure of that 
condition and respondent must then show that 
after "due diligence" it could not know of 
a claim of avoidance, to present a valid defense. 
Respondent waived right to further notice 
and waived any interest in the matter in refusing 
to become a payee thereon. 
The principle carried in the requirement 
of 70A-3-302 that respondent must take in 
"good faith" is defined as "honesty in fact 
in the conduct or transaction concerned." 
70A-l-201 (19) That honesty which would require 
that the informed respondent return to the 
maker, its informant, to determine the validity 
of the instrument to which it became a purchaser 
and to which it now claims to be a holder 
in due course. Respondent failed entirely 
to exercise good faith in performing under 
business standards to become a holder in due 
course. These reasonable commercial standards 
become the axis of the decision under the New 
York Commercial Code in Potter Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Massey, 11 Misc. 2d 523, 171 N. Y. S. 
2d 27 (1958) The Court held that the claimant's 
failure to make further inquiry would indicate 
a deliberate desire on his part to evade knowledge 
being of a belief or fear that an investigation 
would disclose a vice in the transaction and 
prevent the protection of a holder in due 
course. This principal of good faith broadens 
the prior law as to inquiry by the holder 
to not only the actual knowledge required 
by the previous Utah law but to include good 
faith in exercising sound commercial standards 
before respondent could claim to be a holder 
in due course. Respondent refrained from such 
inquiry and is attempting to trap appellant, 
relying only on the irrelevant inquiry of 
the bank whether there were funds in the account. 
70A-3-307 (3) 
POINT III. RESPONDENT IS NOT A "HOLDER IN 
DUE COURSE." 
The respondent made no effort to determine 
from the maker the validity of the check. 
Yet by telephone they had been notified that 
the condition as to payment was the receipt 
of the merchandise and assurred appellant 
that no further notification was necessary for 
they had been paid in full. In First Pennsylvania 
Bank & Trust Co. v. DeLise, 168 Pa. Super 
~oA 14? A. 2d 401. these same provisions 
of the Commercial Code were considered. 
Defendants purchased a home improvement contract 
and signed a note. The note was discounted 
to the bank which claimed to be a holder in 
due course. The bank had received a telephone 
call from the defendants prior to the discounting 
of the note at the bank claiming that the 
work was not finished satisfactorily as of 
that time. The court held for defendants. 
The defendants contended that they notified 
plaintiff that they would not pay the note 
for failure to fulfill the contract or until 
the contract was fulfilled. 
The court held that notice was sufficient 
to shift the burden upon persons claiming 
rights of holder in due course "where the 
makers of a negotiable instrument testify 
that it was fraudulently executed and used 
for a purpose not intended, a breach of faith 
is sufficiently established to require the 
endorsee to assume the burden of proving that 
he is a holder in due course." The telephone 
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conversation put the claimants on notice that 
a defense may exist and that notice took the 
plaintiff out of the protection of the legal 
holder in due course putting it on notice 
and shifting the burden to it to show that 
in fact it exercised due diligence in inquiry 
in order to be found a holder in due course. 
Norman v. World Wide Distributors, 
Inc. 202 Pa. Super, 193 A. 3d 115 (1963) involves 
a "referral sales contract" and upon the prin-
ciple of the Commercial Code required: 
"He who seeks protection as a holder 
in due course must have dealt fairly 
and honestly in acquiring the instru-
ment as to the rights of prior parties, 
and where circumstances are such as to 
justify the conclusion that the failure 
to make inquiry arose from a suspicion 
the inquiry would disclose a vice or 
default in the title, the person is not 
a holder in due course." 
And further held, when a defense appears to 
be meritorious the burden of showing it was 
a holder in due course is on he one claiming 
to be such. 
The holder and respondent herein had 
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knowledge of circumstances which should have 
caused it to inquire concerning the payee's 
method of obtaining the check. Respondent 
had no interest in notice of defense stating 
it was paid in full and did not want its name 
included on the check further stating that if 
any question arose it would call appellant. 
Again, there is basis to determine that 
respondent herein had reason to know that 
there existed circumstances which would have 
made the whole transaction with Allo voidable 
and the check without validity. 
70A-l-201 (25) U.C.A., 1953 
(25) 
when 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
A person has 'notice' of a fact 
he has actual knowledge of it; or 
he has received a notice or 
notification of it; or 
from all the facts and circum-
stances known to him at the time 
in question he has reason to know 
that it exists." 
In Peoples Bank of Aurora Colorado 
v. Haar, (Okla, 1966) 421 P 2d 817, plaintiff 
was presented two checks drawn by defendant 
to Western Aircraft Leasing. 
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The bank called drawee bank and then 
cashed them allowing immediate credit on the 
checks. Defendant became concerned that he 
would not get the interest in Western Aircraft 
Leasing which he purchased and so stopped 
payment. The bank claimed to be a holder 
in due course under the Oklahoma Commercial 
Code. The case was remanded upon the claimed 
defense that the bank had not taken in good 
faith in failng to ascertain the consideration 
for the checks. 
"The evidence did not show clearly 
what his agreement was with the payees, 
but it did indicate the possibility 
of a defense as between the defendant 
and the payees. This is all that is 
required by the law to place upon the 
plaintiff the burden of proving that 
it was in good faith and had no 
knowledge of the defense." 
Budget Charge Accounts v. Mullaney, 
187 Pa. Super 190, 144 A. 2d 438 (1958). The 
Court found that negotiation of a note before 
installation of the appliance pursuant to the 
underlying contract "might well raise a jury 
question as to whether the negotiation was for 
-22-
the purpose of cutting off the defense of 
fraud in the inception and so affecting the 
good faith of the holder 11 • If so, the 
plaintiff could not prove that it is a holder 
in due course "without notice that [the note] 
is overdue or has been dishonored or of any 
defense against or claim to it on the part of 
any person. 11 Therefore, the maker was 
permitted to open the judgment. 
"The burden of proving that an 
instrument is taken in good faith and 
without knowledge of a defense is 
placed upon a party claiming to be a 
holder in due course after the adverse 
party introduces evidence indicating 
the possibility of a defense to the 
instrument as between the payer and 
payee." Peoples Bank of Aurora, Colo-
rado v. Haar, 421 P 2d 817, supra. 
(Syllabus of the Court) 
What the respondent has shown is that 
it is a holder of the appellant's check. It 
has not carried its burden further to show 
that it is a holder "for value", "in good 
faith" or "without notice." 70A-3-302 U.C.A. 
~953 Having failed to comply with either 
of these requirements respondent cannot be 
heard to claim the protection of a holder 
in due course. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Appellant gave legal notice to respondent 
that the check was tendered on condition 
precedent to validity and thus "voidable" 
upon failure of that consideration. Respondent 
did not put forth "due diligenceL to determine 
its rights as a holder nor did it desire 
further notice of defense but sought to avoid 
knowledge of it. Respondent failed to carry 
its burden that as a holder it took "for value", 
"in good faith" and "without notice 11 • It 
was error to grant the Motion for Judgment 
and the judgment should be reversed. 
RICHARDS, BIRD, HART & KUMP 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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